Court-appointed criminal-defense work is among the most important responsibilities lawyers undertake. It is also among the most difficult.
Representing indigent defendants fulfills a core mandate of our profession and gives meaning to the constitutional promise of counsel. But anyone who has done this work knows the reality: the clients can be difficult, distrustful, and desperate. The cases are often unpopular, too. And the emotional toll can be significant.
Still, the professional obligations remain the same—to be a zealous advocate, to act competently, and to do no harm.
Those obligations are tested most sharply, though, when the attorney-client relationship begins to fracture.
No Right to a “Meaningful” Attorney-Client Relationship — But a Professional Expectation
As a constitutional matter, defendants have no right to a “meaningful attorney-client relationship.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13 (1983). The Sixth Amendment guarantees competent representation, not rapport or harmony. But ethical lawyering is not defined by constitutional minimums.
Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct requires lawyers to communicate reasonably with clients: to keep them informed, to consult about the means of representation, and to respond to reasonable requests for information. Pa.R.P.C. 1.4(a). As the Rule makes clear, “[r]easonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation.” Pa.R.P.C. 1.4 cmt. [1].
In practice, this means we strive for functional working relationships even when personal rapport is strained. Many court-appointed representations proceed successfully despite frustration on both sides. The problem arises when that friction begins to materially interfere with the lawyer’s ability to represent the client objectively and effectively.
No Right to Counsel of Choice — And No Unilateral Right to Discharge Appointed Counsel
Indigent defendants do not enjoy an absolute right to counsel of their choosing. As the Third Circuit has explained, “the right to counsel does not include more than the right to representation by competent counsel at trial.” Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 44 (3d Cir. 1985).
Likewise, a defendant cannot simply fire court-appointed counsel at will. But when a defendant makes known a complaint about counsel—formally or informally—the court must address it.
Under United States v. Welty, once a defendant raises dissatisfaction with counsel, “the court must rule on the matter” by making an inquiry into whether good cause exists for substitution. 674 F.2d 185, 188 (3d Cir. 1982). Without even a minimal inquiry, the court has “no way of knowing whether good cause for substitution of counsel exists.” Id.
For appointed counsel, this is a critical inflection point. The client’s complaint should trigger judicial scrutiny of the attorney-client relationship itself.
Why Moving to Withdraw Is Often the Best Practice — and Sometimes Mandatory
Withdrawal should never be reflexive or punitive. But there are circumstances where it is ethically required.
Rule 1.16 mandates withdrawal when continued representation would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. Pa.R.P.C. 1.16(a)(1). One common path to that conclusion arises when deterioration of the attorney-client relationship creates a concurrent conflict of interest.
Under Rule 1.7(a)(2), a concurrent conflict exists where there is a “significant risk” that the representation will be “materially limited” by a lawyer’s personal interest. When hostility, resentment, or breakdown of trust impairs counsel’s independent professional judgment, the lawyer’s personal interest has entered the case.
At that point, continuing representation risks doing harm—even if counsel believes they can “push through.” This is not about discomfort or wounded pride; it is about whether the lawyer can continue to represent the client loyally and objectively. When the answer is no, withdrawal is not abandonment, it is ethical compliance.
Even where withdrawal is not mandatory, Rule 6.2 recognizes “good cause” for seeking relief from appointment, including when representation is likely to result in a Rules violation or when the client or the cause is so repugnant that effective advocacy is impaired. Pa.R.P.C. 6.2(a), (c).
Preserving Confidences While Seeking Withdrawal
Perhaps the most delicate aspect of withdrawal in court-appointed cases is explaining why without saying too much.
The Rules expressly recognize this tension. When withdrawal is based on professional considerations, the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the very facts that justify termination. For that reason, a lawyer’s representation that “professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient.” Pa.R.P.C. 1.16 cmt. [3].
What must be avoided is oversharing. Detailing a client’s refusal to plead, alleged dishonesty, hostility, or poor judgment risks violating Rule 1.6 and unfairly prejudicing the client. See Pa.R.P.C. 1.6(d); Pa.R.P.C. 1.16(d).
The obligation to protect client confidences does not end when the relationship breaks down. It endures through withdrawal and beyond. Pa.R.P.C. 6.2 cmt. [3].
Staying the Course When Ordered
Even when good cause exists, courts sometimes order counsel to remain.
Rule 1.16(c) makes clear that when ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer must continue representation notwithstanding good cause for termination. When that happens, professionalism matters more than ever. Counsel cannot disengage, retaliate, or subtly sabotage the representation. The duty of loyalty remains.
The Professional Measure
Court-appointed representation tests lawyers in ways retained cases often do not. It tests patience, ethics, and judgment under pressure.
How a lawyer handles withdrawal—what is said, what is withheld, and how carefully the client is protected even on the way out—often reveals more about professionalism than any trial outcome.
This work is difficult. It is often thankless. But it is essential. And when representation breaks down, how we respond matters–not only in the particular case but in the long run professionally.