Commonwealth v. Malcolm
In Commonwealth v. Malcolm, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered the propriety of portions of a police interrogation in which detectives repeatedly asserted that they “knew” the defendant was the shooter and suggested he was lying. The Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court declined to adopt a categorical rule barring such statements, thus leaving the admissibility of similar statements to be evaluated under the Rules of Evidence.
But, importantly, five of the seven Justices expressed skepticism about the admissibility of the detectives’ statements and opinions — particularly the detectives’ repeated claims that Malcolm was definitely the person in the shooting video. Still, the case was affirmed not because the Court believed the detectives’ statements were admissible, but because the concurring justices concluded any error in admission was harmless given that there was identification testimony regarding Malcom that the jury heard and weighed
In my view, Justice Wecht’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Todd and Justice Donohue, is worth a read and articulates the better view of this case. That is, allowing detectives to present personal opinions of guilt, cloaked under the guise of interrogation techniques, risks placing the Commonwealth’s authority behind that narrative. These sort of personal opinions are inadmissible and have no place in a trial.
While Malcolm stops short of a bright-line exclusionary rule, it signals that trial courts must scrutinize these interrogation videos carefully, and that defense counsel must be vigilant to push back, and challenge, these sorts of videos from being introduced into evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hawkins-Davenport
In Commonwealth v. Hawkins-Davenport, the Supreme Court addressed whether officers conducting a lawful traffic stop may seize a firearm observed in plain view inside the vehicle without independent proof that the driver is “presently dangerous.” The answer was unanimously yes.
Emphasizing the inherent dangers of traffic stops and relying heavily on two well-known U.S. Supreme Court prcedents—Terry and Mimms— the Court concluded that the combination of a forced police encounter and immediate access to a firearm justifies temporary seizure for officer safety. The stop here was lawful; the gun was unsecured and within reach; and the intrusion was characterized as minimal and precautionary.
The Court distinguished its prior decision in Hicks, where a seizure was based solely on firearm possession, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held was unlawful. Here, the traffic violation triggered the encounter. Once lawfully stopped, officer-safety precautions were permissible as part of the stop’s mission.
The takeaway is straightforward: once a lawful stop is underway, courts will give significant weight to officer-safety justifications when a firearm is accessible. The police may remove the firearm from the vehicle.
Commonwealth v. Mumford (Pa. Super. 2026)
Mumford is largely a sufficiency case addressing two firearm convictions, which was before the Superior Court. But, in my view, the case is important for two procedural reminders.
- Appeal Deadlines and Amended Judgments of Sentence
First, Mumford reinforces that when a trial court properly enters an amended judgment of sentence, the appeal period runs from the entry of that amended judgment provide it was amended properly — not from the original sentence.
- No Definitive Requirement of an On-the-Record Colloquy on the Right to Testify
Second, and perhaps more significantly, Mumford reaffirms that there is no constitutional requirement that a trial court conduct an on-the-record colloquy advising a defendant of the right to testify or to remain silent. “Nevertheless, a criminal defendant must understand his decision not to testify if not by colloquy, then by the presumed competent advice of counsel.”
Commonwealth v. Seals (Pa. Super. 2026) (en banc)
Seals is a lengthy and involved read. But in a unanimous en banc decision, the Superior Court made several important points, which was encapsulated in the concluding paragraph of the opinion:
A challenge to the trial court’s authority to impose a sentence pursuant to section 9771(c) is a legality of sentencing claim . . . . Furthermore, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771, as amended by Act 44, applies to revocation of probation with restrictive conditions imposed in connection with treatment courts (previously known as problem-solving courts). Finally, all provisions of the Sentencing Code amended by Act 44 apply to defendants who were sentenced or resentenced on or after June 11, 2024, and, with the exception of the portion of Act 44 codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9774.1, apply retroactively to defendants sentenced or resentenced before that date.
To elaborate: 1) challenging the trial court’s authority to impose a sentence under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c) is not about the court’s exercise of discretion, so it is not a claim that needs to be preserved—it’s a nonwaivable claim implicating the legality of the sentence. 2) The recently enacted law making sweeping changes to Pennsylvania’s probationary system—known as Act 44—applies to probationary sentences with “restrictive conditions,” even those imposed as part of Pennsylvania’s treatment courts. 3) Act 44 applies retroactively, except the portion of Act 44 that requires probation-review conferences and mandates the early termination of probation under certain conditions. That portion of Act 44 is forward looking, applying only to persons placed on probation after Act 44’s enactment.