Recently, the Superior Court issued a decision in Commonwealth v. Charles-Richardson, 2026 PA Super 27, which involved a parole absconder who returned to court to answer for violations that occurred while his parole was tolled and before his tail of probation began.
Charles-Richardson was serving a sentence involving incarceration followed by a term of probation. He was paroled from the incarceration portion of his sentence, but before his probationary term was to begin, a warrant issued for him on new charges. He failed to appear and was considered absconded. For roughly fifteen months he remained a fugitive. During that time, he was arrested and convicted in another county.
When he was finally returned to the court overseeing his parole, the court revoked his probation and imposed a new sentence of 2 to 14 years’ imprisonment. The problem there, however, was that all of the misconduct at issue occurred while Charles-Richarson was still on parole. Under relatively recent case law out of the Superior Court (Simmons) and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (Rosario), the thrust of this recent case law is that a trial court may not revoke probation before the probationary term begins. If the defendant is on parole, the court may address a parole violation, but it may not “anticipatorily” revoke the probationary tail.
The trial court recognized that problem. Its solution, though, was to turn to what is known as the “fugitive forfeiture doctrine.” That doctrine is grounded in a simple idea: a person who evades the authority of the court should not be permitted to demand the court’s protection at the same time. Traditionally, it has been applied in the appellate context, where courts have refused to reinstate post-trial rights or entertain appeals from defendants who fled and later returned complaining that their post-sentencing and appellate rights need reinstated.
The trial judge reasoned that Charles-Richardson should not benefit from the fifteen-month gap he created by absconding. Because his sentence was tolled during that period because he was absconded, the court viewed it as unfair to limit its authority to mere “back time” on parole. In other words, the trial court tried to use the fugitive forfeiture principle to justify reaching forward and revoking probation, even though probation had not yet begun.
The Superior Court rejected that approach. Tolling cuts both ways. If the parole portion of the sentence stopped running while he was a fugitive, then probation had still not started when the new offenses occurred. And while the fugitive forfeiture doctrine may limit certain procedural rights, it does not expand a sentencing court’s statutory authority. Courts derive their power to revoke probation from statute. That statute does not permit revocation before probation begins.
The case is a reminder that in sentencing law, structure matters. The line between parole and probation is important for discerning what options the trial court has when addressing violations.