In Pennsylvania, a person who grabs a purse from someone’s arm and runs can be convicted of robbery. In most other states, the same act is a theft. That difference can add years to a federal sentence.
On November 6, 2026, the Third Circuit held in United States v. White, No. 22-2197 (3d Cir. Nov. 6, 2026), that third-degree felony robbery under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v) is not “robbery” as the federal Sentencing Guidelines use that word. Judge Freeman wrote for a unanimous panel that included Judges Krause and Roth. Because the Pennsylvania conviction is not a “crime of violence,” it cannot be used to raise a sentence under the Guidelines provisions that depend on that term. The court vacated Mashaq White’s sentence and sent the case back for resentencing.
How a Prior Conviction Raises a Federal Sentence
The Sentencing Guidelines are the rules federal judges use to calculate an advisory sentencing range. Several Guidelines provisions push that range up when the defendant has prior convictions for a “crime of violence.” The provision in White’s case, § 2K2.1(a)(1), sets the highest starting point for an unlawful gun possession offense when the gun was a semiautomatic capable of accepting a large-capacity magazine and the defendant already had at least two felony convictions for a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. The definition of “crime of violence” that § 2K2.1 borrows comes from § 4B1.2(a), which is also the definition used to decide who is a “career offender.”
That definition has two parts. The first, called the elements clause, covers any felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. The second, called the enumerated offenses clause, lists crimes by name: murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, and certain firearm and explosives offenses.
Courts decide whether a prior conviction fits either clause using what is called the categorical approach. The court does not look at what the defendant actually did. It compares the elements of the state statute with the elements of the “generic” version of the listed crime, meaning the crime as it is commonly understood across the country. If the state statute covers the same conduct or less, the conviction counts. If the state statute can be violated by conduct the generic crime does not reach, the statute is broader, and no conviction under it counts, no matter how violent the defendant’s actual conduct was.
What Happened in White
In June 2020, Philadelphia police responded to a reported burglary at a Rite Aid and saw White running down an aisle with a gun in his hand. An officer tackled him and recovered a semiautomatic pistol. He pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Everyone agreed the gun qualified and that White had one prior conviction that was a crime of violence. The enhancement depended on whether his Pennsylvania third-degree robbery conviction was a second one.
The probation office’s presentence report said it was not. The government did not object to the report, but it later argued the opposite in its sentencing memorandum and at the hearing. White argued below that the government’s late objection violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, which sets deadlines for objecting to the presentence report, but he did not press that argument on appeal.
The District Court sided with the government. The enhancement raised White’s advisory range from 100–125 months to 140–175 months. Because § 922(g)(1) then carried a ten-year maximum, the advisory sentence became 120 months. The court varied downward based on White’s background and imposed 110 months.
Pennsylvania’s Version of Robbery
Pennsylvania grades robbery by the harm caused or threatened. The lowest grade, a third-degree felony under § 3701(a)(1)(v), applies to anyone who, in the course of a theft, “physically takes or removes property from the person of another by force however slight.”
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained how slight that force can be in Commonwealth v. Brown, 484 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1984). The victim there heard footsteps behind her, someone grabbed the purse slung over her arm, and she saw Brown run off with it. The Court upheld the robbery conviction. It held that any amount of force applied to a person while committing a theft is enough, and that even a slight tug on the arm to pull a purse free qualifies.
What separates this crime from pickpocketing, the Court said, is the victim’s awareness. A pickpocket uses no force and poses no threat because the victim does not know the theft is happening. A victim who is aware of the taking is likely to react to protect herself and her property and may be hurt. Justice Zappala dissented, writing that the majority had effectively held that a taking from the person is force by definition.
Later decisions have followed Brown. In Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209 (Pa. Super. 2008), the Superior Court upheld an F3 robbery conviction where the defendant took a wallet out of the victim’s hand and ran. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 550 A.2d 579 (Pa. Super. 1988), it reversed a conviction where the defendant rolled an unconscious man over to take his wallet, because the victim was not aware of any force. And in Commonwealth v. Moore, 494 A.2d 447 (Pa. Super. 1985), the court called purse snatching the most common crime the subsection was meant to cover.
The Third Circuit noted that this puts Pennsylvania in the minority. Citing the LaFave and Wharton criminal law treatises and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Sein, 590 A.2d 665 (N.J. 1991), the court explained that most jurisdictions treat a sudden snatching as larceny and reserve robbery for cases involving more force. Pennsylvania is free to define its own crimes that way. The question was what that choice means in federal court.
The Earlier Case: Peppers and the Elements Clause
This was not the first time the Third Circuit looked at Pennsylvania F3 robbery. In United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2018), the court considered whether the offense was a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA, the federal statute that imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum on certain gun offenders with three prior violent felonies or serious drug offenses. ACCA has an elements clause worded the same way as the Guidelines’. Under Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), that clause requires violent force, meaning force capable of causing physical pain or injury. Peppers held that because Pennsylvania F3 robbery can be committed by “the merest touching,” it does not meet that standard. In United States v. Henderson, 80 F.4th 207 (3d Cir. 2023), the court applied the same result to the Guidelines’ elements clause.
ACCA’s list of named crimes does not include robbery, so Peppers settled the question under that statute. The Guidelines’ list does include robbery. That left the government one more argument: even if F3 robbery fails the elements clause, it might still match “robbery” in the enumerated offenses clause. White answers that argument.
What “Generic Robbery” Requires
The 2021 Guidelines, which governed White’s sentencing, did not define “robbery,” so the court applied the generic definition: the taking of property from another person or from that person’s immediate presence by force or intimidation. The Third Circuit had said in United States v. Graves, 877 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 2017), that generic robbery requires “no more than de minimis force.” But it had never said what de minimis force means. The court decided that here because the comparison could not be made without it.
The answer came from Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. 73 (2019). There the Supreme Court held that Florida robbery is a violent felony under ACCA because it requires force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance, which is also the force required for common law robbery. The Court said that standard is met however slight the resistance, but it is not met by the merest touching. It also recognized that Florida courts draw a line between overcoming resistance and a mere snatching. A defendant who snatches money from a victim’s hand and runs has not committed robbery. A defendant who steals a gold chain has not used enough force simply because the victim felt his fingers on her neck. A defendant who grabs the victim’s fingers and peels them back to get the money has.
Both sides in White agreed that the Stokeling standard defines generic robbery, and the court accepted that agreement. It pointed out that a significant majority of states have long defined robbery that way, and that the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have equated generic robbery with the Stokeling standard. It also noted, in a footnote, that the Sentencing Commission amended § 4B1.2 in November 2023 to define robbery for the first time, and that the new definition requires “force that is sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance,” language the Commission said it took from Stokeling.
Why Pennsylvania’s Statute Is Broader
With both definitions settled, the comparison followed. Generic robbery requires force sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance, which the merest touching does not supply. Pennsylvania F3 robbery can be committed by the merest touching. So Pennsylvania’s statute covers conduct that generic robbery does not, and under the categorical approach, no conviction under it qualifies.
The court said the purse-snatching cases confirm the result. Under Brown and Bedell, Pennsylvania treats a typical snatching as F3 robbery even when the victim offers no resistance. Under Stokeling, a mere snatching is not generic robbery because some resistance, however slight, has to be overcome.
The government relied on Graves, where the Third Circuit had held that North Carolina common law robbery matches generic robbery. The government’s argument was that North Carolina and Pennsylvania both require only de minimis force, so they should be treated the same. The court disagreed by reexamining what Graves had called de minimis force. In the North Carolina case Graves relied on, the defendant pushed the victim’s hands off a box of cigarettes, which is force that overcomes resistance. North Carolina also follows the majority rule that a sudden snatching is not robbery; its courts reversed a robbery conviction where the only force was the force needed to pull a purse off the victim’s shoulder. Pennsylvania courts treat that same act as F3 robbery. The two states’ force requirements are therefore different, and Graves did not help the government.
The panel concluded that White did not have two qualifying prior convictions, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing without the § 2K2.1(a)(1) enhancement.
What White Means for Federal Sentencing in Pennsylvania
For defense lawyers in the Eastern, Middle, and Western Districts of Pennsylvania, the immediate consequence is that a prior conviction under § 3701(a)(1)(v) is not a crime of violence under either clause of § 4B1.2(a), at least under the pre-2023 Guidelines that White applied. That matters for the § 2K2.1 gun enhancements and for career offender designations, which use the same definition. The holding addressed the 2021 Guidelines, but the court said the 2023 definition rests on the same Stokeling standard and supports its conclusion, so the argument under the current Guidelines begins from the same comparison.
The holding is limited to the subsection at issue. Pennsylvania’s higher grades of robbery, which require causing or threatening bodily injury, were not before the court, and White says nothing about them. Because the categorical approach turns on which subsection a client was convicted under, the first step is to pull the certified record of the prior conviction and confirm the subsection rather than relying on how the presentence report describes it.
White also shows how these issues can arise late. Probation concluded the conviction did not qualify, and the government disputed that conclusion only after the deadline for objecting to the presentence report. White raised Rule 32 in the District Court but dropped it on appeal, so the opinion does not address what effect a late government objection should have.

